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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the underlying sources of economic concentration in 
Israel, which is unusually high for a developed and innovative economy. After 
a brief review of Israel's economic history since the start of the British 
Mandate, we describe the level of economic concentration, privatization policy 
and other public policies that potentially contributed to the creation and 
sustainment of the concentration problem. We argue that privatization is not 
likely to be a causal factor, mostly because concentration was present and 
substantial at least two decades before modern privatization policies were 
adopted. It is more plausible that other economic policies, such as R&D 
subsidies, tax breaks for capital investment, export subsidies, tariffs, stringent 
regulations and barriers to competition played a major role in the emergence 
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1. Introduction 
Israel is a world leader in technological innovation. According to the World 
Economic Forum, Israel ranks1st out of 144 countries in the quality of scientific 
research institutions, 3rd in innovation, 4th in patent applications per million 
population, and 6th in company spending on R&D (Schwab (2012)). In 2010, 
expenditure on R&D in Israel was 4.4% of GDP, the highest amongst OECD 
countries and more than twice the EU average (OECD (2010)). Israel trails 
only China in having the most foreign companies traded on the Nasdaq. 
One of the most curious aspects of the Israeli economy is that its stellar 
performance in the area of scientific and technological innovation is 
accompanied by an unusually high degree of economic concentration. Israel’s 
Herfindahl Index (HHI) well exceeds most other developed countries. The 
share of market value held by the largest 10 Israeli business groups, or 
business “families”, is 30%. This places Israel in the top 30th percentile of the 
most concentrated economies in the developed world (Kosenko (2008)). 
The correlation between technological innovation and economic concentration 
in Israel might suggest that monopoly power is more conducive to innovation 
than a competitive market.i While this is likely to be true to some degree 
because of the prominent role of the military and technological spillovers to 
the private sector, concentration in the Israeli economy is also a widespread 
phenomenon. It encompasses industries and sectors that are not much 
involved in research and development.ii 
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While the academic debate on the optimal market structure for innovation may 
still be ongoing, the focus of the public discourse in Israel lies elsewhere. It 
centers almost exclusively on the high cost of living that results from 
economic concentration. The prevailing populist view is that concentration and 
the high cost of living are a direct byproduct of faulty privatization policies. 
This view has an important influence on public policy and serves as a 
substantial impediment to further privatization and enhanced price 
competition. 
The main contribution of this paper is to point out that economic concentration 
in Israel is not due to faulty privatization policies. Rather, it is has been 
engendered by anti-competitive policies partially aimed at fostering 
technological innovation and sustaining the "Start-up Nation" (Senor and 
Singer (2009)). The current situation in Israel serves to highlight the 
unintended consequences and substantial social costs that can accompany 
any benefits deriving from misguided government-led technology and trade 
policy. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
the modern history of the Israeli economy. Section 3 provides background on 
privatization policies in Israel. Section 4 describes current levels of economic 
concentration and how they came about. Section 5 discusses the main 
government policies, other than privatization that are responsible for creating 
and sustaining the problems associated with economic concentration. The last 
section summarizes and concludes. 
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2. A Brief Review of Israeli Economic History 
Between 1917 and 1948 the seeds of the pre-state Israeli economy were 
planted under the shadow of British rule and conflict with the Arabs. The 
Jewish community combined a strong socialist identity with reliance on private 
capital for growth. The economy was dominated by agricultural collectives 
(Kibbutzim and Moshavim), an all-powerful federation of trade and labor 
unions (the Histadrut) whose headquarters in Tel Aviv was nicknamed the 
“Kremlin”, and a central government that owned all of the land. 
After the War of Independence in 1948, the Israeli economy continued to be 
controlled by the unions and the government. But the focus of the economy 
began to shift away from agriculture and towards basic industries such as 
textiles and clothing. Economic policy also changed focus, concentrating 
mostly on absorbing immigrants, encouraging investment by Jewish 
entrepreneurs from abroad, and protecting local industries (import 
substitution). 
Despite several attempts to liberalize the economy (especially in the late 
1970s), protectionism, union domination, and massive expenditures by the 
central government (including necessarily high Defense outlays) continued 
unabated. This inevitably led to an unsustainable public debt burden, 
monetization, and hyperinflation. By 1985, Israel had no choice but to 
introduce a radical and comprehensive stabilization program that shocked the 
economy onto a new trajectory. The need for a modern market economy 
began to be taken more seriously. 
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Since 1985, economic liberalization has made important but still limited 
inroads. Public and private monopolies, as well as vestiges of a soviet style 
bureaucracy, continue to inhibit the ability of immense levels of human capital 
to be exploited more widely. Economic concentration and the high cost of 
living have recently spurred a social justice movement, inspired by protests in 
Egypt and Spain and similar in spirit to Occupy Wall Street, which is 
preventing a more energetic pursuit of privatization and enhanced price 
competition in the Israeli economy.iii 
3. Privatization in Israel 
The Israeli government formally adopted a policy promoting privatization in 
the late 1970s. However, significant privatizations did not begin until after the 
stabilization program in 1985. The perceived successes of privatization in the 
UK under the Thatcher government made it politically easier for many 
governments around the world, including Israel, to accelerate privatization 
plans. The UK experience also provided best-practice techniques for effective 
implementation (see Megginson and Netter (2001)). 
Between the years 1986 and 2009, a total of 96 companies were privatized in 
Israel. Table 1 lists the major privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
that took place during that period. Privatizations were accomplished in many 
sectors of the economy, including chemicals, banking, shipping, travel, and 
telecommunications. 
Table 1 here 
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Methods of privatization in Israel varied. In the case of the banks, the Bank of 
Israel's policy was to auction core control rather than disperse stocks across 
the market. This created the possibility for business groups to control major 
banks without holding a majority of stocks. In the cases of Bezeq Telecom 
and Israel Chemicals, shares were offered on the stock exchange. Employees 
of SOEs often received discounted stock options. 
From 1991 to 2008, the Israeli government collected over $14 billion in 
revenue through the privatization of SOEs. This is roughly similar to the 
amount of revenues raised by China between 1991 and 2003, which yielded 
$18 billion from the privatization of minority blocks in several hundred large 
SOEs. This amount of revenue is also comparable to what was raised in the 
Russian privatization (Guriev and Rachinsky (2005)). 
Table 2 lists the revenue by year both in nominal terms and as a proportion of 
the government’s budget. Revenues grew between 2000 and 2005, reaching 
a maximum of 3.1% of the state budget in 2005. This is a relatively low 
percentage. In many countries, privatization revenue accounted for 10% or 
more of the government budget (Megginson (2005)). Revenues from 
privatizations in Israel then fell off sharply in 2008, coinciding with the 
beginning of the global financial crisis. 
Table 2 here 
Table 3 shows that there are still 92 SOEs operating in Israel, spanning many 
sectors of the economy. These SOEs include the national electricity and water 
corporations, three seaports, the railway, the post, and several major 
companies in the defense industry. In addition, the government owns 
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approximately 90% of the land, public housing worth an estimated $4.2 billion, 
and virtually all civilian infrastructure. As of 2012, Israeli SOEs accounted for 
2.8% of GDP.iv 
Table 3 here 
In nominal terms, government holdings in SOEs have been estimated to be 
worth $13.4 billion (Government Comptroller Report (2012)). Table 4 lists the 
corporations and their estimated values if they were to be privatized. These 
data suggest that the Israeli government has exploited to date only about half 
of potential revenues from privatization. 
Table 4 here 
Public response to privatization efforts has been mixed. There is general 
satisfaction with reduced prices and better service in some industries, 
especially telecommunications. According to a 2007 survey by the Israel 
Democracy Institute, 45% of Israelis support privatization of SOEs and 
government services in principle, against 33% who oppose. But there is also 
concern about the effects of privatization on economic concentration, income 
inequality, and the loss of public control over national resources. 
Economic concentration, the influence of “oligarchs” and the consequent high 
cost of living is the deepest public concern. In 2010, the government 
addressed the public concern by establishing a committee tasked with 
increasing competition in the economy. The committee, widely known in the 
press as the "concentration committee," recommended tightened regulation 
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on the ability of major business groups to simultaneously own stocks of both 
financial and non-financial corporations, and to receive government benefits.  
The exact reason why there is a public perception that modern privatization 
policies gave rise to oligarchs in Israel is hard to establish. It is possibly 
related to the corrupt transfer of assets that characterizes the well-publicized 
Russian privatization experience (see Black et al. (2000)). 
4. Economic Concentration and the Rise of Oligarchs 
According to the Bank of Israel (Kosenko (2008)), the 10 largest business 
groups in Israel control 30% of the total market value of publicly traded 
companies. As of December 2009, the 16 largest business groups control 
over 50% of the total market value. In addition, 88% of publicly traded 
companies are run by a control core. In at least one third of these companies, 
the control core owns less than 50% of the shares. Moreover, 79% of 
business groups are characterized by a pyramid-like structure of at least two 
layers. Business group membership is most common in heavily regulated 
industries. 
According to Israel's Securities Authority, the market share of the largest 10 
business groups in Israel is larger than in all other OECD countries examined. 
This includes other relatively small economies such as Korea, Hong Kong, 
Belgium, Switzerland, Singapore and Finland. This may have the 
consequence of rendering the large business groups "too big to fail." 
According to the Bank of Israel, over 50% of Israel's pension funds' 
(institutional investors) exposure to stocks is in shares of companies 
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controlled by the 10 largest business groups (as well as over one third of bond 
exposure). 
The largest business group pyramids control major companies across all 
sectors of the economy. For example, the IDB Group, run by the Dankner 
family, owns companies in the banking, insurance, investment, 
telecommunications, airline, construction, chemicals, and high tech industries. 
The Israel Corporation, run by the Ofer family, owns companies in the 
banking, chemicals, shipping, high tech, media and real estate industries. 
Key sectors of the economy are also highly concentrated. In the banking 
sector, a duopoly of the two largest banks share 50% of the market. Together 
with the next three largest banking groups, five banking groups control 93% of 
market share. All major banks, as well as 5 of the 6 major financial 
institutions, are run by a control core. The banking sector is highly regulated 
and strict licensing requirements have resulted in not a single new bank being 
established in the country since the 1960s. 
In the construction industry, a single provider, Nesher Cement of the IDB 
group, supplies 85% of the domestic market, while the remaining 15% is 
imported. Imports are subject to quotas. In the dairy market, 10 suppliers have 
captured more than 50% of market share. In the food industry in general, 
government policies dictate target prices, production quotas and high tariffs, 
making it nearly impossible for SMEs to arise and compete with large 
corporations. 
The severe concentration and control of large swaths of the economy by a 
small number of business families have little to do with modern privatization 
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policies followed by Israel since the stabilization program in 1985. The rise of 
large business groups in Israel has its origins at least two decades earlier. 
Reparations from West Germany started to flow into Israel in 1952. The 
reparations were in return for slave labor, persecution and property stolen 
from the Jews during the Holocaust. In 1956, the reparations reached 87.5% 
of state income. Foreign aid also arrived in Israel in the form of economic and 
military assistance from the US. US assistance became substantial starting in 
1971 and now comprises 18-22% of Israel’s defense budget. In addition, the 
French arms embargo, following the six-day war in 1967, prompted Israel to 
adopt protectionist policies and prioritize the development of independent 
industries, especially in the defense sector. 
The massive foreign inflows from Germany and the US had the effect of 
reducing the economy's dependence on private investment from abroad and 
discouraged successive governments from pursuing economic efficiency 
measures. Coupled with protectionist policies, originally implemented in part 
for national security reasons, local business groups were able to capture large 
shares of the domestic market (see Maman (2002)). 
In the case of the Israel Corporation, currently one of the largest business 
groups in the country, there can be little doubt of the government's 
contribution to the group's rise. Saul Izenberg established the Israel 
Corporation in 1968. In order to attract Izenberg's capital to Israel following 
the six-day war, the state granted an exemption from corporate taxes and 
other substantial benefits for a period of 30 years. The Israel Corporation was 
also allowed to exclusively buy assets from the government. 
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The government continues to pursue policies that have the consequence of 
protecting and subsidizing large business groups. Through measures such as 
investment encouragement grants and tax breaks, chief scientist grants for 
research and development, and export subsidies, Israeli governments have 
channeled billions in taxpayer money to the economy's largest business 
groups, sustaining concentration and maintaining the high cost of living which 
is the main focus of recent social protests. 
5. The Consequences of Government Technology, Trade and 
Competition Policy 
Research and Development (R&D) Grants 
In order to help develop the high tech industry, the government set up a grant 
program for companies investing in R&D. The grants are under the 
supervision of the Chief Scientist Office, which is part of the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Employment. In 2009, 573 companies received grants, but 15% 
of the total amount of funds went to only 10 recipients. This inequality in 
distribution is part of a long-lasting pattern. In 2007, 2% of recipients received 
20% of the funds. In 1998, 24 companies received 39% of the total. 
The Chief Scientist Office claims that only 17% of its budget goes to large 
corporations (with revenues exceeding $100 million). But this figure does not 
tell the whole story. First, companies with revenues near $100 million are 
large corporations relative to the size of Israel's economy. Second, Israel's 
major business groups control a broad range of companies. This means that 
many grants received by SMEs are in actuality being “transferred” to the 
oligarchs.v 
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It is also important to note that the R&D grant program requires companies 
that receive funds to conduct at least 50 percent of their production in Israel or 
else pay a large fine. In certain markets, this means that independent SMEs 
must contract out the services of major business groups. For example, in 
2002, grant recipients in the semiconductor industry were essentially forced to 
produce at Israel's only semiconductor factory, owned by the Ofer group. 
The Capital Investment Encouragement Law (CIEL) 
Under CIEL, the Investment Center, which is part of the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Employment, grants subsidies and tax breaks to companies 
contributing to exports and employment in the country's periphery. It was CIEL 
that allowed Izenberg’s Israel Corporation to receive an exemption from 
paying corporate taxes for 30 years, and to exclusively buy assets from the 
government. 
CIEL continues to contribute to economic concentration. During the 1990s, it 
was found that companies receiving CIEL grants have greater revenue and a 
larger number of employees than the average firm (Kosenko (2008)). In 2002, 
486 companies received tax breaks, but 60% of the total amount was granted 
to only 10 companies. In 2007, 57% of the total value of tax breaks was given 
to only 5 companies. 
As an example of the relationship between CIEL and the oligarchs, the Ofer 
group received a grant of $250 million for establishing a semiconductor 
factory (Tower Semiconductors) in 2000. The group also received substantial 
grants for their other companies that year, e.g., Dead Sea Factories ($14 
million), Oil Refineries ($11 million), and Novatide ($2 million). Note also that 
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many companies owned by the Ofer and IDB groups, as well as large publicly 
held companies, receive both R&D and CIEL grants in the same year. 
Export Subsidies 
Exports account for 40% of Israel’s GDP. The Israeli government subsidizes 
exports through several means. First, it supplies business services to 
exporters through the Israel Export Institute (50% owned by the government). 
Second, it offers exporters subsidized insurance through the Israel Foreign 
Trade Risk Insurance Corporation (100% owned by the government.). Third, it 
promotes the exports of Israeli diamonds, through the Israel Diamond Institute 
(25% owned by the government). Fourth, it provides guarantees for exporters 
through insurance companies and other financial corporations. 
The result of government export subsidization is a highly concentrated export 
market relative to the non-export market. In 2007, 25 companies were 
responsible for 45% of the value of exported goods and services, excluding 
diamond exports. Among those 25 companies are 5 firms owned by the Ofer 
group and 2 owned by IDB. In terms of exporting companies, 2 percent of 
exporting firms were responsible for 65 percent of the value of exported goods 
and services. Among these exporting firms is LLD Diamonds, owned by 
"oligarch" Lev Levaiev. 
Monetary policy in Israel can also be considered a form of export subsidy. The 
Bank of Israel supports exporters by regularly purchasing foreign currency to 
maintain exchange rates below the market price. By the end of 2012, the 
Bank of Israel held $75.9 billion in foreign currency. These foreign currency 
reserves constitute 31.3% of Israel’s GDP. 
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Competition Policy 
In addition to R&D grants, tax breaks, and export subsidies, the government 
has also contributed to economic concentration by holding back competition. 
In certain sectors, such as banking and insurance, businesses are protected 
from competition by high entry barriers set up by government regulators. As 
mentioned earlier, over-regulation in the financial sector has resulted in not a 
single new bank being established in Israel since the 1960s. 
It is important to note that the banking and financial sectors are the core 
activities of the large business groups. It is well established that these groups 
use their direct and indirect control of credit to leverage their non-financial 
enterprises. They can also quite effectively crowd-out or otherwise prevent 
loans to be made to SMEs and other potential domestic competitors. 
Reducing the extent of regulation and encouraging competition has a direct 
effect on economic concentration and the viability of the large business 
groups. A prime example is when the government opened up the cellular 
phone sector to competition in 2011. As a result, prices fell drastically, and so 
did the profits of the existing cellular phone companies. Reduced profits for 
cellular phone company Cellcom, one of the major holdings of the IDB group, 
is one of the main reasons it is currently in negotiations for a haircut with 
banks and bondholders, and its owner may lose control of the group. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that economic concentration in Israel was 
caused by and is currently sustained by government policies that benefit large 
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business groups over independent SMEs. Ironically for the “Start-up Nation,” 
the offending policies include R&D grants. In addition, tax breaks for capital 
investments, export subsidies, tariffs, stringent regulations and barriers to 
competition are at fault. Economic concentration and the rise of oligarchs did 
not result from privatization. It began much before modern privatization 
practices were put in place. 
Privatization has played a central role in the liberalization of the Israeli 
economy since 1985. The result has been a substantial rise in GDP per 
capita, life expectancy and other measures of life satisfaction and 
development. This is in full accordance with the empirical evidence on 
privatization in both transition and non-transition countries (Meggison and 
Netter (2001), Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006)). 
Further privatization and the opening of markets to real competition, 
especially in the banking and financial sectors, will help reduce economic 
concentration, the problem of the oligarchs, and the high cost of living. This 
will hopefully be recognized at the political level as the most promising way 
forward for the Israeli economy, as well as the most expedient way to address 
the understandable social unrest that economic concentration has 
engendered. 
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Table 1: Major Privatizations: 1986-2009 
SOEs Year of Privatization 
Israel Chemicals and 23 subsidiaries 
 
1992 
5 major banks (Leumi, Poalim, 
Discount, Mizrahi and Igud) 
1990-2005 
 
IDB Development 2003 
Zim International Shipping 2004 
El-Al Airlines 2005 
Bezeq Telecom 2005 
Oil Refineries 2006-2007 
Note:	  The	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (SOEs)	  listed	  in	  the	  table	  were	  either	  fully	  or	  partially-­‐
owned	  by	  the	  government.	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Table 2: Revenues Raised Through Privatization (Millions of US$): 
% 
Government 





 535 1995 
 121 1996 
 2,397 1997 
 1,715 1998 
 382 1999 
1.2 666 2000 
0.1 45 2001 
0.2 99 2002 
0.6 383 2003 
0.3 189 2004 
3.1 1,848 2005 
2.5 1,551 2006 
2.2 1,553 2007 
0.4 340 2008 
 14,256 Total 
Note:	  Revenue	  figures	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  Government	  Corporations	  Authority.	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Housing, construction 10 
Oil and gas 6 
Agriculture 7 
Utilities (electricity and water) 5 
Unionized retirement savings and 
investment 12 
Transportation and communications 10 
Tourism 8 
Industry and commerce 8 
Arts and culture 7 
Other 13 
Total 92 
Note:	  Data	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  Government	  Corporations	  Authority. 
  
	  21 	  
Table 4: Estimated Value of Government Holdings, 2012 
Type of Holding Name / Description Worth (billion USD) 
SOE Israel Electricity 
Corporation* 
4.8 
SOE Mekorot – Water 
Corporation 
1.3 
SOE Israel Railway 
Corporation 
1.7 
SOE Israel Sea Ports 
Corporations 
2.7 
SOE Military Industry 1.6 
SOE Post 0.1 
SOE Leumi Bank** 0.3 
Other asset Public housing 4.1 
Other asset Other Real Property 11.0 
Other asset Civil infrastructure 43.9 
Other asset Military equipment 18.7 
Other asset Machines and 
equipment 
2.4 
Other asset Land*** 84.7 
Note:	   Data	   are	   taken	   from	   the	  Government Comptroller. *Value not including 20.5 
billion USD of debt. ** The government owns 6% of the Bank. *** Approximately 90% 
of the country's land is owned by the government. 
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i	  See	  Schumpeter	  (1942),	  Arrow	  (1962)	  and	  more	  recently	  Schleifer	  (1998)	  for	  analyses	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  market	  structure	  and	  innovation.	  
ii	  Such	  as	  the	  banking	  sector,	  where	  5	  banking	  groups	  control	  93%	  of	  market	  share,	  the	  food	  
industry,	  and	  the	  auto	  import	  industry.	  
iii	  See	  Klein	  (2005)	  for	  a	  guide	  on	  more	  comprehensive	  reviews	  of	  the	  Israeli	  economy. 
iv	  Since	  the	  mid	  1980s,	  SOE	  activity	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  has	  decreased	  from	  10	  to	  5%	  in	  
industrialized	  countries,	  from	  11	  to	  5%	  in	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  and	  from	  15	  to	  3%	  in	  
low-­‐income	  countries	  (Sheshinski	  and	  Lopez-­‐Calva	  (1999)).	  
v	  Between	  2006	  and	  2010,	  at	  least	  24	  companies	  owned	  by	  the	  Ofer	  Group	  received	  R&D	  
grants.	  In	  the	  framework	  of	  grants	  to	  companies	  in	  technology	  incubators,	  an	  additional	  10	  
firms	  owned	  by	  the	  Ofer	  Group	  received	  grants.	  At	  least	  13	  companies	  owned	  by	  the	  
Dankner	  group	  (IDB)	  received	  grants,	  excluding	  companies	  in	  incubators	  owned	  by	  IDB. 
.  
